This note provides a retrospective on lessons learned in research on conflict forecasting, motivated by reflections around the retirement of Professor Michael D. Ward from Duke University. I argue that an excessive focus on "black swans" or surprising events that are hard to forecast detracts from considering the more frequent "white swans" or regularities in conflict. It is often more useful to focus on modal conflicts than exceptions, and substantial progress has been made in recent research. I identify some key lessons learned and highlight the need for researchers to distinguish between features that are more or less difficult to forecast.
There is a second important lesson here: A model can only be expected to predict if it has some factors plausibly related to the causes of conflict. Beck et al. basically estimated a version of the Oneal and Russett (2001) liberal peace model, focusing on how a series of liberal factors would make conflict less likely. However, the underlying dyadic risk of conflict or the origins of conflict is treated as largely exogenous in this framework. This may be a perfectly valid approach to testing whether liberal dyads are more pacific, but we should not expect it to be a good model for forecast -a completely different purpose than what it was originally devised for. Ward and Gleditsch (2002) examine how spatial features and diffusion can improve conflict forecasts as examples of plausible influences that can be observed ex ante. Other factors reflecting motives for conflict can be useful to identify differences in risk and improve forecasting (see Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013) . Gleditsch and Ward (2013) showed how focusing on contentious issues and how these are managed could improve forecasts of interstate conflict, although the availability of the data used currently limits the ability to conduct such forecasts.
A large body of research has showed ways to improve predictive models of conflict through avenues such as improved attention to factors reflecting motives, autoregressive trends and the tendency for conflict events to recur, as well as networks structure and spatial patterns (see Hegre et al., 2017; Ward et al., 2013 for reviews) . Forecasting is also often a more useful form of theory evaluation, by evaluating propositions on genuinely new data, that guards against the temptation to overfit to the observed data. Hans Reichenbach's important distinction between "the context of discovery" and "the context of justification", later popularized by Popper (1959) , often seems to be forgotten in much empirical work that "tests" a proposed explanation on the same data that inspired the proposed explanation.
In sum, although forecasting is difficult, especially about the future, existing research demonstrates that much can be forecast, and that forecasting also can serve as an important check on theory evaluation. However, there are different types of events and forecasts, and some are more difficult to do than others. In general, predicting recurrent events in a conflict prone relationship will be much easier than predicting surprising new events. Researchers should take pride in what they can do well and be explicit but not defensive about the taller orders.
The enduring relevance of many of the above lessons is also apparent in recent discussions of conflict trends and risks. Many argue that there has been a clear decline in violence (Goldstein, 2011; Gurr, 2000; Pinker, 2011) , while critics argue that features of severity-frequency distribution and the timing of conflicts make it impossible to reject the null hypothesis of no underlying change in the risk of severe wars without a much longer period without major world wars (see Cirillo & Taleb, 2016; Gleditsch & Clauset, 2017) . The latter argument is often seen as inherently undermining any possibility of forecasts. But there is no inherent contradiction in acknowledging that it is difficult to say something about the risk of very large events, and that we can still make useful predictions about profiles of actor or locations with a higher risk of conflict. We may not be able to offer very precise predictions of how implausible a new World War III would be over the next 100 years based on the existing data and models. However, if we can predict some of the smaller events likely to occur over a shorter future time interval and more precise locations, then this is valuable in its own right and also more useful for many purposes.
Some concede that conventional war may have declined, but argue that other forms of violence such as terrorism have increased. Although some data suggest an increase in terrorism (e.g. Global Terrorism Index, 2015), it can be shown that most terrorist attack actually occur within countries that already experience conventional conflicts, such as for example Afghanistan and Iraq. There may be many reasons why terrorism is used more intensively within current civil wars (see for a review of rebel characteristics and use of terrorism). But if the increase in terrorism occurs primarily within conventional conflicts then it cannot convincingly be claimed to undermine the case for a decline in conventional civil conflict.
However, even if terrorism has not clearly increased outside civil war, one may ask whether terrorism outside civil war plausibly differ from terrorism within civil war. For example, terrorism outside civil wars such as IS attacks in the West could be less frequent in numbers but on average more severe, as suggested by some observers that see terrorism as a highly unpredictable "existential threat". Data and models can serve as check on popular perceptions and a useful way to evaluate risks. It can be shown that terrorism like many other conflict data follow so-called power laws, where the frequency of an event is an inverse power of its severity (see Clauset, Young & Gleditsch, 2007; Richardson, 1948) . More formally, the frequency of events of a given severity × scale as P(x) ∝ x −α , where α indicates the relative frequency of the more severe events, with severity typically measured by the number of deaths for conflict data. Hence, the lower the α, the more likely are the larger events given their frequency, and the more worried we should be about the impact of potential catastrophes (see Hanson, 2008) . Gleditsch, Polo, and Ruggeri (2017) shows that the scaling coefficient for terrorism outside civil war (α ≈ 2.48) seems somewhat lower than within civil wars (α ≈ 3.05), or severe attacks are relatively outside civil wars given the frequency of attacks. The frequency-serverity distributions for terrorist attacks inside and outside civil wars are shown in Figure 1 . However, the powers are still relatively high in comparison to other forms of disasters, far from the threshold of powers below 1 where Hanson (2008) suggests one should be willing to spend proportionally far more to prevent and respond to the very large events.
Figure 1:
The frequency-severity distribution for attacks and associated casualties in the Global Terrorism Database (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/), separating by location in countries with and without an ongoing armed civil conflict in the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (http://ucdp.uu.se/), from Gleditsch, Polo, and Ruggeri (2017) . The overall volume of terrorism is much lower outside civil war, both in terms of absolute frequency or total deaths, but the more severe individual attacks are plausibly relatively more frequent outside civil war.
The attacks patters of groups outside civil war are likely to more difficult to detect, since groups rely more on covert planning and carry out fewer attacks (see Clauset, Young & Gleditsch, 2007) . But this does not mean that all the terrorism that we should care about cannot be forecast. The largest impact of surprising terrorist attacks stems from the responses they generate rather than the deaths or direct impact of the attacks themselves (see Mueller & Stewart, 2015) . If we care about the overall number of attacks and deaths then we should care about terrorism in civil war, which is likely to be much more frequent and displaying regular patterns that are easier to predict. Figure 2 shows that a very large share of the recorded terrorist attacks in Western Europe in the post 1945 period have been carried out by ethnic separatist movements (based on data from . Research further indicates that ethnic terrorism can be reduced through forms of ethnic accommodation and concessions in much the same way as civil wars (see . Even IS itself originated out of civil wars in the Middle East. Thus, understanding the relationship between civil war, terrorism, and the diffusion of violence elsewhere may ultimately have bigger payoffs than focusing exclusively on preventive measures that have been shown to have low cost effectiveness (Mueller & Stewart, 2011) . (Engene, 2007) , by (A) events and (B) total deaths in attacks, adapted from Gleditsch and Polo (2016) .
The disproportionate attention to the failures of forecasting spectacular events reminds us about what we do not know and what is hard to predict. However, it understates how much has been learned about forecasting the other end of the distribution, and the further gains that plausibly can be made. And even when we cannot forecast something we can surely learn much more if we focus on the specific things that limit our ability than just throwing our hands up in the air. One of many things that I have learned from working with Mike Ward is that perseverance and not giving up at the first hurdle is key, and this has clearly paid off in work on forecasting conflict.
